Abstract
The origins of the psychological contract literature
The literature on the psychological contract has expanded considerably over the past 10 years, primarily under the influence of Rousseau (1989; . However, the concept has a much longer and deeper pedigree, with its antecedents evident in earlier work on social exchange theory. Central to this theory is that social relationships have always been comprized of unspecified obligations and the distribution of unequal power resources (Blau, 1964) . In terms of organizational analysis, social exchange constructs are clearly evident in the work of Argyris (1960) , Levinson et al. (1962) , and Schein (1965; . Argyris (1960) used the term 'psychological work contract' to describe an embeddedness of the power of perception and the values held by both parties (organization and individual) to the employment relationship.
Significantly, this earlier literature illustrates the point that employment relationships are shaped as much by a social as well as an economic exchange (Fox, 1974) . Developing this further, Levinson et al. (1962: 21) saw the psychological contract as "a series of mutual expectations of which the parties to the relationship may not themselves be dimly aware but which nonetheless govern their relationship to each other". According to Schein (1978) , these expectations between the organization and individual employee do not only cover how much work is to be performed for how much pay, but also a whole set of obligations, privileges and rights. Schein It is important to acknowledge the contextual factors which contributed towards cultivating the psychological contract literature, as much of it has underpinned subsequent research and analysis (Herriot, 1992) . Arising from these contextual dynamics was a series of changes which seemingly called into question many of the assumptions of 'traditional' employment relations systems. Guest (2004) articulates the view that workplaces have become increasingly fragmented because of newer and more flexible forms of employment. (Leisink et al. 1996; Kitay and Lansbury, 1997; Kalleberg and Rogues, 2000; Allvin and Sverke, 2000; Lo and Aryee, 2003) . Such literature discourse has evidently served as a fertile breeding ground upon which an analytical framework like the psychological contract could prove productive.
It seems then, that with its emphasis upon the informal and the perceptual, the theory of the psychological contract is often regarded in the literature as a germane conceptual lens that fits with the changing contours and pressures emanating from global economics and shifting employment patterns (Herriot, 1992) . It seeks to go beyond the limitations of the legal contract of employment -which focuses exclusively upon the formalised aspects of work -and instead considers some of the subjective and normative elements associated with people management (Arnold, 1996) . Moreover, it appears particularly useful in acknowledging that the economic and formal aspects of employment are inevitably influenced by informal social interactions. It also recognises that employment includes implicit and unspecified expectations which provide the relationship with a strong element of indeterminacy. In that sense, managing people at work is portrayed as containing a strong social dynamic, rather than a purely static and once-off economic transaction.
Conceptually and theoretically, the literature surrounding the psychological contract has helped to understand the ever changing parameters of employment relations. Although as we argue below, a lot more needs to be done and existing conceptualizations require more critical and engaging frames of analysis.
Defining the core of psychological contract
Despite a bourgeoning of interest and wealth of literatures pertaining to the psychological contract, there remains no one or accepted universal definition (Anderson and Schalk, 1998 Atkinson et al. 2003; Tekleab and Taylor, 2003) . The attendant result is that some authors seem to be measuring different aspects of the same construct (Roehling, 1997 (Morrison and Robinson, 1997; Conway and Briner, 2002) .
However, Rosseau's re-conceptualization of the construct of the psychological contract is not without its critics. Guest (1998) has argued that the psychological contract should return to its roots in the form of including an 'employer perspective' in order to be able to fully assess the notion of mutual and reciprocal obligations.
According to Guest (2004) , for the psychological contract to be a suitable tool for analysing the employment relationship, it needs to realise the employment relationship is a twoway exchange, with the focus squarely upon the perceptions of reciprocal promises and obligations of both parties (see also Guest, 2004a) . Guest (1998) has also suggested that the conceptual distinctions between 'obligations' on the one hand, and 'expectations' on the other, are somewhat obscure (1) . Guest's (1998 Guest's ( , 2004 re-assessment is useful because it opens up questions surrounding the conceptual and 1 Recognising this deficit, Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler (2000) argue that more empirical work is needed to clarify whether the two variables are actually different. Thus while there remains divergence around the validity of including an employer's perspective on the psychological contract, recognition of its worth is growing in the literature (Porter et al. 1998; Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler, 2002; Tekleab and Taylor, 2003 Usually, research focuses on employees'
perceptions of the breach of expectations by the employer, for example in relation to job security, opportunities for development which in turn can lead to feelings of injustice or betrayal among workers (Morrison and Robinson, 1997) .
Numerous studies focus on attitudinal reactions to contract violation, in terms of organizational commitment (Lemire and Rouillard, 2005) , work satisfaction (Sutton and Griffin, 2003) , work-life balance (Sturges and Guest, 2004) , job security (Kramer et al. 2005) , motivation (Lester et al. 2001) and stress (Gakovic and Tetrick, 2003) . Others have assessed violation in terms of behavioural consequences, such as organizational citizenship behaviour (Othman et al. 2005) , employee turnover (Sturges et al. 2005 ) and job performance (Lester et al. 2002) .
Ultimately, what many of these studies show is Until some of these ignored sources are grappled with, studies searching for the attainment of a healthy psychological contract may be pursing a lost cause in search of an organizational chimera.
We address these ignored issues as follows. 
Can the psychological contract be considered a 'contract'?
Central to the theoretical assumptions behind the psychological contract literature is the notion of the subjective interchange between employer and employee having (or having the potential to) contractual status. This issue, as to whether the concept of a psychological contract can be constituted as a 'contract', has been considered by Guest (1998 Guest ( , 2004 In legal terms, the notion of a contract implies an agreement or at least the outward appearance of an agreement. Yet given that the psychological contract is orientated towards subjective perceptions -or as Rousseau (1995: 6) has stated 'agreement is in the eye of the beholder' -the potential for reaching such agreement or finding the 'zone of acceptance' is inherently problematic. To put it another way, it is very difficult to pin down precisely at what point the psychological contract might be successfully negotiated (Guest, 2004) . Indeed this problem is even more pertinent if the contract is viewed as some form of ongoing process (Herriot and Pemberton, 1997) . As Guest (1998:652) observes, "where the implicit encounters the implicit, the result may be two strangers passing blindfold and in the dark, disappointed at their failure to meet".
In contrast to the psychological contract, a legal contract is one that is more formal, written down and verbalized between the two parties.
This suggests that both parties have read and agreed to its terms and conditions. In such an instance, this type of contract becomes quite difficult to change without some degree of consent between the contracting parties. As the literature on psychological contracting illustrates however, it is not subject to such contractual restrictions because it has been exclusively constructed through the individual's unvoiced expectations and subjective feelings (Rousseau, 1995 Setton et al. (1996) have referred to as 'multiple exchanges'. Clearly, it would seem unlikely that each of these agents will provide employees with exactly the same expectations.
This leads to a rather ambiguous position in conceptualizing which organizational agents are likely to be the most prominent or influential in constructing different expectations.
Furthermore, the notion of making a contract with an organization is made increasingly difficult given the increased use of non-standard forms of employment, such as in the case of agency workers or multi-site employers. In many instances, it is often unclear as to who the actual employing organization might be (Rubery et al. 2004) . The apparent ambivalence towards their actual employer was made explicit by one baggage handler who commented: "Our commitment will be to Airline D because if they think we are not good enough, then we have to go back to FH (their employer)" (Cooke et al., 2004: 188) .
In relation to the construction of a psychological contract, the above illustrates the 
Mixed messages and divergent expectations
Even recognizing that employers generally have a greater degree of power and authority to shape expectations, it is possible that the management of a psychological contract can promote a climate of 'people-building' rather than 'people-using' in HRM (Guest and Conway, 2002:22) (Guest and Conway, 2002) .
A central component in Guest's (2004:550) analytical framework is a set of variables which seek to measure 'reciprocal promises, conditioned by hegemonic influences that we often take for granted or simply perceive as 'the way things are' (Gramsci, 1971) . Take, for example, the increasing tendency in many Western societies to define and restructure social and economic relations around a neo-liberal paradigm that has at its core the promotion and legitimization of a market-based rationality (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Fournier and Grey, 2000) . The neo-liberal paradigm is so strong that for many citizens any alternative is inconceivable, or that neo-liberalism is not an ideology which can be challenged. This alerts us to the fact that a prevailing 'dominant ideology'
can, in turn, shape an individual's value system and recast their sense of reality to what appears to be natural, immutable and even 'modern' (Habermas, 1978; Foucault, 1980) . ideological appeal rather than any particular grounding in empirical reality (Keenoy, 1997) .
For a start, the language of the psychological contract literature is firmly rooted in that much favoured rhetorical device of management -the 'all changing' world (Thompson and O'Connell-Davidson, 1993) . A polarised caricature is frequently set up between a supposedly placid, stable past and a new, innovative and highly competitive present (Flood et al. 2001; Guest, 2004 with evidence of over-generalisability or a great deal of exaggeration (Thompson and McHugh. 2002:167-190) . In addition, there is a remarkable familiarity with much of this literature with the discourse of a previous eranotably Bell's (1973) shaping employment practices (Bacon, 2003; Guest, 2004 (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999) . The end result is that the maladjusted individual (or group) expectations become the problem, rather than the system and the dominant ideological paradigm that individuals and groups inhabit (Hollway, 1991) . 
Summary and conclusions
Since its introduction under the work of Argyris (1960) , the psychological contract has offered an alternative reading of the employment relationship outside of the narrow legalistic frame of reference -one that expresses the subjective and indeterminate aspects of employment relations and HRM. Under the influence of Rousseau (1989; 
